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involves identifying the root causes of the 
conflict and establishing whether they have 
been resolved by the international mission’s 
presence. The third standard is political. This 
standard involves a measure of whether an 
effective state or legitimate political regime 
exists after the mission’s end. The fourth 
standard deals with an economic aspect. This 
standard uses the economic recovery as a 
measure for mission success and includes 
indicators such as GDP and poverty levels.1) 
Presumably, while these four standards are 
not equally assessed, they are among the most 
common and universally accepted standards 
in concluding the extent of success of each 
peace-building case by the UN.
 This paper applies the four standards of 
Charles Call to the case of Timor-Leste. The 
international community provided a significant 
amount of commitment and contribution to 
peacekeeping and peace-building in Timor-
Les te .  S ince  1999 ,  the  in te rna t iona l 
community had provided Timor-Leste the 
non-UN security missions such as INTERFET 
Introduction
 Peace-building efforts have been examined 
by academic research, from which many 
lessons were learned for the following 
missions. At the same time, in the post-
conflict periods, each case has been reviewed 
and assessed whether it was successful or not, 
with a  lot  of  indicators  or  standards. 
Interestingly, the assessment of the mission’s 
success depends on which standards one 
adopts. 
 Charles T. Call identifies four standards for 
success of  peace-building that appear 
regularly in the literature. The first standard 
concerns security. This minimalist approach 
concerns the question of whether a war or 
conflict has recurred after the international 
peace operations have left. This standard 
requires that the original conflict that led to 
the international peace operations should not 
re-emerge in the early years after the 
international withdrawal. The second standard 
concerns a social aspect. This standard 
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remained calm” almost became jargon. In fact, 
the Secretary-General report indicated, for 
example, that the incidence of serious crimes 
such  as  murder,  abduct ion  and  rape 
significantly decreased to 9 cases per month 
during the period of January to August 2007 
from 29 cases per month in the last reporting 
period.2) This figure was further decreased to 
5 cases per month during the next period of 
August  2007 to 7  January 2008 3),  was 
decreased to 4 cases during the next period4), 
and then to only 2 cases per month during the 
period of July 2008 to January 2009.5)
 Meanwhile, the most serious incident during 
the UNMIT period was the assassination 
attempts of President Jose Ramos-Horta and 
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao by the group 
of rebel leader Alfred Reinado on 11 February 
2008. On these events, President Ramos-
Horta was seriously wounded, and Reinado 
was shot to death. UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon condemned this attempted coup 
including the attack on the President as 
“brutal and unspeakable”6) and condemned “in 
t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p o s s i b l e  t e r m s  t h e s e 
unacceptable attacks on the legitimate 
institutions of the state.”7) Initially, Prime 
Minister Gusmao issued the 48-hour’s state of 
emergency and afterwards Parl iament 
extended it for another two months.
 The post-independence period in Timor-
Leste witnessed the regular occurrence of 
security turbulence such as the riots of 
December 2002, the incidents in Lospalos in 
and ISF mainly led by Australia, and UN 
political and peacekeeping operations such as 
UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNOTIL, and 
UNMIT. The last international operations, 
UNMIT and ISF completed their missions at 
the end of 2012, and currently Timor-Leste 
identifies the so-called “post conflict” period. 
Therefore, this paper deals with the review of 
peacekeeping and peace-building in Timor-
Leste with Charles Call’s four standards of 
successful peace-building. After arguing four 
standards, this paper conducts comparative 
analysis with the cases of Haiti, Afghanistan 
and Sri Lanka.
Security
 The first UN peacekeeping force in Timor-
L e s t e  w a s  U N TA E T  d e p l o y e d  a s  a 
comprehensive nation-building mission in 
1999. Following the UN peace operations of 
UNTAET, UNMISET, and UNOTIL, the UNMIT 
period identified very few problems involving 
pro-Indonesian militias. This is partly due to 
the improvement of the state’s diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia.
 
 Meanwhile, the security crisis in 2006 which 
inevitably required the establishment of 
UNMIT was not caused by pro-Indonesian 
militias but by more domestic factors such as 
political rivalry. And UNMIT evaluated its own 
mission highly positively in terms of security 
maintenance. In accordance with the reports 
of the Secretary-General,  the security 
s i tuat ion had improved,  in  which the 
statement “the overall situation in Timor-Leste 
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also be members of the (in)security groups in 
Timorese society which might generate the 
causes of conflicts, a potential for the state to 
request international peace missions in the 
future again.
 In accordance with the Secretary-General’s 
report, an incident of concern occurred on 7 
July 2009 when a fight broke out between 
youth gangs at  a  market  in  Bobonaro 
District.11) In 2010, the Secretary-General was 
cautious about a number of violent incidents 
between young gangs. One of the most serious 
took place on 16 December 2010 in Ermera 
District where one person was killed, two 
were injured and 24 houses were destroyed.12) 
On 14 August 2011, a fighting between 
members of two MAGs in Covalima District 
led to the burning of 58 houses and the 
displacement of 168 families with 33 suspects 
arrested.13) Furthermore, there is a growing 
concern that a number of MAG-led incidents 
have involved PNTL and F-FDTL officers. 
Therefore, the Council of Ministers decided 
that any PNTL or F-FDTL members who were 
found to be involved in such incidents would 
be subject to disciplinary measures, including 
dismissal from their respective institutions.14) 
Finally, on 3 March 2014, the Timorese 
parliament unanimously approved a measure 
that authorized the national police to put an 
end to the activities of two notorious MAGs, 
namely, KRM and CPD-RDTL.15)
 Therefore,  i t  can be concluded that 
although UNMIT and its previous UN missions 
2003, Catholic-inspired demonstrations in 
20058), the severe crisis of 2006 and the above-
mentioned attacks on the president and the 
prime minister in February 2008.9)
 Furthermore, state security in Timor-Leste 
has been significantly damaged when it is 
linked to the involvement of Timorese youth 
gangs called “martial arts groups (MAG)” and 
the following occurrences of excessive force 
by the national police (PNTL) and/or the 
national military (F-FDTL). In fact, the issue 
of MAG – comprising an estimated 90,000 
members, or just under one-tenth of the 
population – became a serious concern by 
UNMIT during their missions before its 
departure from the state in 2012. 
 James Scambary defines these groups as 
informal security groups with a wider 
framework, even including rural-based 
millenarian groups, veterans groups and 
political-front groups. There are more than 
t h r e e  h u n d r e d  o f  t h e s e  g r o u p s  i n 
contemporary Timor-Leste. These groups 
have been deeply rooted in the society of 
Timor-Leste, dating back to the Portuguese 
era. It is problematic that high-ranking leaders 
are often employed in senior positions in 
government, international NGOs, and even UN 
agencies in Timor-Leste. Group members can 
also be found throughout civi l  society 
organizations, including human rights and 
even conflict-resolution NGOs.10) Therefore, in 
Timor-Leste, Timorese members of UN 
agencies and conflict-resolution NGOs might 
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Timor-Leste, it would be the culture of rivalry, 
hostility, resistance and violence. Lee Jones 
argued that successful peace-building involves 
not just the construction of institutions but 
also the construction of viable socio-political 
a l l i ance  that  can  agree  on  how state 
institutions and capacities are to be created, 
developed and prioritized. He maintained that 
the history of Timor-Leste, especially under 
the Indonesian rule, indicated that many 
Timorese led by FRETILIN resisted the 
imposition of Indonesian state structures on 
the territory. Thus, from the very beginning 
the state apparatus took a markedly coercive 
form that was reliant on heavy military 
spending from Indonesia. Furthermore, 
Indonesian state-building failed to penetrate 
Timorese  soc iety.  Instead,  i t  became 
interpenetrated with it. The anti-FRETILIN 
elite provided militias, joined the local 
administration and parliament and formed 
alliances with the Indonesian military to retain 
exist ing or  establ ish new businesses . 
Indonesia ruled through local tribal chiefs as 
Portugal had before it.16)
 UNTAET had similar experience as the 
previous Indonesian rule in Timor-Leste. 
UNTAET was unable to graft its ideal-type 
state onto Timorese society. Instead, the 
emerging Timorese state became subject to 
emerging rivalries over power and resources 
in the impoverished territory.17) It can be 
recognized by the security crisis in Timor-
Leste in 2006. The 2006 crisis was triggered 
by social conflicts between Timor-Leste 
contributed to the overall national security 
improvement, it left Timor-Leste without 
solving several domestic security-related 
issues  such as  youth gangs  and their 
connections with the national security 
institutions. There is still a possibility that 
Timor-Leste will experience security crises 
which are similar to ones in 2006 when the 
violent incidents were triggered by political 
turbulence, combined with the excessive use 
of force by PNTL and F-FDTL.
Root Causes (Social)
 Call defines root causes of modern conflicts 
as a social aspect, since most of the internal 
conflicts in the post-Cold War conflicts such as 
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have 
been related to religions and ethnicity. 
However, in the case of Timor-Leste the 
conflicts in September 1999, which required 
the international missions such as INTERFET 
and UNTAET, were the militia campaigns led 
by anti-independence groups instigated by the 
Indonesian troops, TNI. Therefore, the root 
causes of the conflicts in Timor-Leste, which 
were not religious and ethnic conflicts, were 
not social but political. In this sense, UNTAET 
played a role not only as a traditional 
administrator in East Timor but also as a 
political bridge between Indonesia and East 
Timor. Consequently, East Timor, which was 
named officially as Timor-Leste, achieved 
independence in May 2002.
 However, if one still considers the social 
aspect as the root causes of the conflicts in 
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 Matthew Arnold claimed that the petitioners 
and mutineers in the 2006 crisis highlighted 
the limits of what international actors can 
achieve within the context of an indigenous 
political situation that is in manic flux.21) These 
events indicated that the UN missions had not 
played a significant role to enhance domestic 
security. It is partly because the UN missions 
could not solve the social problems, which 
were not direct but indirect causes of 
traditional conflicts in Timor-Leste. 
 In the history of the involvement of 
international organizations in post-conflict 
areas, peace-building and state-building have 
tended to be an easy access to the political 
and legal areas. Political issues such as 
democratization and election monitoring, and 
legal issues such as justice and human right 
monitoring, have been positively tackled by 
UN peace operations. However, the social 
aspects and values such as the cultural and 
traditional issues are rather difficult for 
external organization to touch upon even if 
they might be the causes of intractable 
conflicts. This tendency can be recognized in 
the case of  Timor-Leste.
Political
 When one defines the political success in 
the post-conflict peace-building process as the 
implementation of democratic elections, 
Timor-Leste is, without any doubt, a politically 
successful case in building a democratic 
country. Timor-Leste conducted parliamentary 
elections in 2001, 2007 and 2012. Presidential 
Defense Force (F-FDTL) and the National 
Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), between 
“westerners” and “easterners”, and between 
Timorese political leaders. These conflicts 
have been attributed to their own social 
backgrounds. Many members in F-FDTL are 
former FALINTIL guerrillas who fought 
against Indonesian’s security forces, and many 
members of  PNTL used to  serve with 
Indonesian police. Many western parts of 
Timor-Leste gained a reputation as pro-
Indonesian stronghold, while many easterners 
had a more resistant stance against Indonesia. 
As mentioned before, the politicians were 
divided between those who spent the years of 
Indonesian occupation in exile like Mari 
Alkatiri, and those who remained in East 
Timor like Xanana Gusmao.18) Such social 
divisions, combined with the legacies of 
resistance and violence which tended to 
mobilize irregular armed groups for political 
ends, resulted in incessant internal conflicts in 
Timor-Leste. Irregular armed groups in Timor-
Leste also have a long tradition to have been 
mobilized and trained by a succession of 
colonial powers, including Portugal, Japan and 
Indonesia.19)
 The social legacy of resistance was also 
identified in Timorese people. Since 1999 
Timorese have felt increasingly free to criticize 
and question their political leaders, and that 
they had a sufficiently strong “opposition 
culture” to vote to change the government in 
2007.20)
― 136 ―
埼玉学園大学紀要（経済経営学部篇）　第15号
of activity that lacked sufficient support in the 
constitutional letter. It was recognized in the 
first president’s creation of a team to work on 
the issue of veterans. Though this issue was 
taken up by Prime Minister Alkatiri in 2005, 
President Gusmao was in charge of final 
decision of this particular policy. Meanwhile, 
Ramos Horta, replacing Gusmao’s presidency, 
considered it his duty to offer an “emergency 
aid” to cases of particular hardship. He 
created a team that provided responses to 
such appeals within one month. In both cases, 
the presidents in Timor-Leste took an 
initiative on conducting some executive 
duties, regardless of the restrictions that the 
letter of the constitution imposed on the 
president’s powers in this domain.25)
 The president Horta’s unilateral decision 
was also identified in his pardons in recent 
years which resulted in the release of actors 
in the 2006 crisis, including the former interior 
minister. After the 2006 crisis, although the 
four soldiers were convicted by the civilian 
court and sentences ranging between 10 and 
12 years, they did not spend any time in 
civilian prison. Instead, the F-FDTL set up 
military detention facilities following the 
conviction, to detain the convinced soldiers. 
The convinced soldiers continued to receive 
salaries while the widows of the slain PNTL 
officers did not receive their compensation 
payments of US$2,500 from each of the 
individual soldiers, which was ordered by the 
court decision in 2007. An opinion poll 
conducted by Asia Foundation in 2008 
elections were also successfully conducted in 
2002, 2007, and 2012. Timor-Leste also adopts 
multi-political system. The first parliamentary 
election in 2001 saw the participation of 
twelve parties. At the last parliamentary 
elections in 2012, CNRT, led by Prime Minister 
Gusmao, won 36.66 per cent of the votes; 
FRETILIN, led by former Prime Minister 
Alkatiri won 29.87 per cent; the Democratic 
Party (PD), led by National Parliament 
President Fernando de Araujo, won 11.30 per 
cent; and Frenti-Mudanca (FM), led by Vice-
Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres, won 3.11 
per cent.22)
 M e a n w h i l e ,  t h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  t w o 
characteristics featuring politics in Timor-
Leste. First, there have been political rivalry 
and hostility in Timor-Leste. Especially, 
division in the national political leadership 
between Gusmao and Alkatiri had been 
deteriorating after Alkatiri’s FRETILIN wrote 
an independence constitution that created a 
weak presidency for Gusmao to take assume.23) 
The second political characteristics in Timor-
Leste were it’s “winner-takes-all” approach, 
and the country’s hierarchical and closed 
political culture. While these characteristics 
contributed to the success of a national 
resistance movement, it has been detrimental 
to political legitimacy and democratic process 
in Timor-Leste.24)
 In fact, both Gusmao and Ramos Horta 
lacked respect for the state’s constitution. 
Both of them had been able to engage in areas 
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building on the whole in Timor-Leste. 
 The political dogma was also identified in 
the relations between the UN and the political 
figures in Timor-Leste. First, like previous UN 
miss ions  in  Timor-Leste ,  UNMIT was 
committed to its engagement primary with 
state authorities, paying less attention to an 
a d v o c a c y  r o l e  f o r  a  w i d e r  Ti m o r e s e 
community. The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Atul Khare, had a point of 
his weekly consultations with senior political 
leadership in the state. The security crisis in 
2006 demonstrated a lack of political reform, 
which was partly due to the UN’s sole 
alignment to senior level political leaders.29) 
Meanwhile, the political leaders in Timor-
Leste kept some distance from the policy and 
guidance provided from the international 
community including UNMIT. Ramos Horta’s 
decision of political pardons was clearly a 
result of his marginalizing stance from the 
recommendation of an Independent Special 
Commission of Inquiry that 63 people should 
be prosecuted in the 2006 crisis.30) The audit 
group of the UN dispatched to Timor-Leste in 
2009 also accepted that UNMIT’s security 
sector advisers were underutilized primarily 
due to the Government’s lack of cooperation 
with UNMIT’s support.31)
 Among the traditional principles in UN 
operat ions  is  the importance of  local 
acceptance  f rom hos t  count r i es .  UN 
operations should be advised to depart from 
host countries when they indicated less 
indicated that an overwhelming majority of 
respondents did not support pardons for 
serious crimes, and no political party gave 
support  to Ramos Horta ’s  proposal  of 
establishing a truth-for-amnesty system for 
t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  2 0 0 6  c r i s i s . 26 ) 
Nevertheless, the president’s policy of political 
pardon controversially culminated in August 
2010, when the authority released 26 soldiers 
and paramilitary police officers who had been 
convinced of serious crimes related to the 
2006 crisis. 
 In Timor-Leste, political pardons are highly 
related to political and social culture of 
patron-client relationship.27) In other words, 
“clients” are likely to be given pardon by the 
p o l i t i c i a n s  o r  t h e i r  “ p a t r o n s ” .  T h i s 
manipulation can be possible due to the 
absence of strong political institutions in 
Timor-Leste, which, however, exacerbated 
reliance on patron-client networks as the 
source of political power. Therefore, the 
survival of political elites in the “winner-takes-
all” culture depends on the success of their 
network, and giving pardons to “clients” has 
been significant patronage resources and 
methods.28) Thus, state-building in post-
conflict areas is thwarted by the use of 
patronage resources.
 A patron-client network can be identified 
not only between politicians and convicted 
persons but also politicians and youth gangs. 
This network has resulted in the significant 
deterioration of domestic security and state-
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underweight. The amount which the poor 
spend on food has not kept pace with GDP 
growth.35)
 There are very few industries which will 
hopefully contribute to economic growth and 
support national finance in the future. A 
coffee industry, which is one major economy 
in Timor Leste, decreased its export in 2013, 
and cereal production also fell by 20% in the 
same year. In fact, the current governmental 
policy towards economic recovery has been 
short-sighted, which can be recognized by the 
fact that Timor-Leste is one of the most 
petroleum-dependent countries in the world. 
Oil and natural gas revenues have been 
p r o v i d i n g  m o r e  t h a n  9 8  p e r  c e n t  o f 
government revenues.36) The Petroleum Fund 
plus foreign exchange reserves, which are 
$14.9 billion, are 9.2 times annual non-oil GDP. 
Since the natural resources in the national 
territory in Timor-Leste, mainly in Timor Sea, 
have been considered to be exhausted in a 
decade, the financial resources for the 
government in the future would be far from 
optimistic. 
 Nevertheless, the expenditure of the 
government  in  Timor-Leste  has  been 
excessively generous to the vulnerable, 
especially, after the security crisis in 2006. 
Each petitioner in the 2006 crisis was eligible 
to receive $8,000 – 70 times the monthly 
minimum civil service wages. Between 2008 
and the end of 2010, the government closed 
all the IDP camps and spent $56.8 million in 
enthusiasm or reluctance to host the UN 
missions. This case was exactly what had 
happened in the latter periods in UNMIT 
before withdrawing from Timor-Leste on the 
end of December 2012. Therefore, the 
withdrawal of UNMIT did not necessarily 
mean the resolution of political aspects in the 
post-conflict state-building in Timor-Leste.
Economic
 Countries with low human development 
tend to experience more civil conflicts than 
t h o s e  w i t h  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  h u m a n 
development. According to statistics of UNDP, 
more than half the countries with a GDP 
capita of  US$2,000 or  less  in 1990/91 
experienced some form of civil war between 
then and the year 2000; less than one fifth of 
countries of GDP per capita over this mark 
experienced. Conflict itself retards human 
development, and this generated a cycle of 
violence and development failure.32)
 Timor-Leste had witnessed impressive 
economic growth rates from 2007-11 (10% in 
2011). One can also see a decline in official 
poverty rates, the population on or below the 
poverty line of $0.55 per day, from 50% to 
41%.33) Yet, Timor-Leste is still suffering from 
national poverty. The state has a low Human 
Development Index ranking, the 134th. Life 
expectancy is 55.5 years, and 73 per cent have 
no access to electricity.34) The 2009-2010 
Demographic and Health Survey found little 
improvement in children nutrition since 2007, 
with 45% of children under 5 years old 
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instrument and the possibility of obtaining 
loans.39) On the whole, economic recovery and 
human development were identified in Timor-
Leste, which contributed to peace-building in 
a positive way, while one cannot be optimistic 
about  the  perspect ive  o f  susta inab le 
development of economy in Timor-Leste. 
 
Comparative Analysis
 This section conducts a comparative 
analysis among the states which experienced 
internal conflicts. The purpose of this analysis 
is to compare Timor-Leste with other states 
experiencing internal conflicts, in considering 
the effectiveness and the extent of success of 
their peace-building process. Three states, 
Haiti, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka which this 
analysis focuses on, are considered to be 
instructive to compare with Timor-Leste. Haiti 
is the case in which the state hosted UN peace 
operations, UNMIH and MINUSTAH, the same 
case as Timor-Leste. Afghanistan is the case in 
which the state hosted non-UN peace 
operations, namely, ISAF. Sri Lanka is the case 
in which the state experienced internal 
conflicts but hosted no international peace 
operations. The indicators of the success of 
peace-building in this analysis are GDP per 
capita as an economic factor, mortality rate as 
a human development factor, democracy 
index as a political factor, and corruption 
perception index as a social factor. (See 
Tables 1 to 4.)
recovery grants. Most of this was in the form 
of family grants of $4,500 for those who could 
p r o d u c e  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e i r  h o m e ’s 
destruction.37) The government’s aggressive 
expansion of spending was also identified in 
welfare and civil service. The cash grant for 
the elderly had improved monthly payments 
of $20 to all over 60 since May 2008. Likewise, 
the benefits for single mothers with children 
have been paid when they enrolled in schools. 
Above all, the amount of the pensions to 
veterans of the struggle for independence was 
enormous, ranging from $2,760 to $9,000. The 
above three pensions, which are for the 
elderly, single mothers and veterans, have 
about 110,000 beneficiaries in the small state 
of Timor-Leste with the population of only 1 
million.38)
 Evidently, the government could afford 
theses expenditure due to temporal but 
enormous amount of revenues from fees and 
royalties deprived from offshore oilfields. It 
has also contributed to post-independence 
stability and security. However, an economy 
dominated by petroleum exports itself 
generates little employment and invest in little 
productive activity. Needless to say, the 
government is required to create a new and 
s u b s t i t u t e  i n d u s t r y  f o r  s u s t a i n a b l e 
development in economy of Timor-Leste after 
the limited amount of natural resources is 
exhausted in the near future. In August 2011, 
parliament approved the amendment to the 
2005 Petroleum Fund Law, allowing for 
increased flexibility of investment in various 
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Table 1. GDP per capita (US$)
Timor-Leste
(UN mission)
Haiti
(other UN mission)
Afghanistan
(non-UN mission)
Sri Lanka
(no international mission)
1999 　 485 　 822
2000 410 427 　 855
2001 493 402 115 838
2002 474 363 186 904
2003 468 314 198 985
2004 471 401 220 1,063
2005 487 449 252 1,242
2006 456 520 275 1,423
2007 534 628 374 1,614
2008 644 665 377 2,014
2009 745 663 451 2,057
2010 818 670 561 2,400
2011 960 732 614 2,836
2012 1,068 771 687 2,932
(Source: The World Bank)
Table 2. Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live birth)
Timor-Leste
(UN mission)
Haiti
(other UN mission)
Afghanistan
(non-UN mission)
Sri Lanka
(no international mission)
1999 112 109 137 18
2000 106 105 134 17
2001 101 102 131 16
2002 95 99 128 16
2003 90 96 124 15
2004 85 93 121 14
2005 80 91 118 13
2006 75 88 115 13
2007 71 86 112 12
2008 68 84 109 11
2009 65 82 106 11
2010 62 175 104 10
2011 59 78 101 10
2012 57 76 99 10
(Source: The World Bank)
Table 3. Democracy Index (including world ranking out of 165 countries)
Timor-Leste Haiti Afghanistan Sri Lanka
2006 6.41 (65th) 4.19 (109th) 3.06 (135th) 6.58 (57th)
2008 7.22 (47th) 4.19 (110th) 3.02 (138th) 6.61 (57th)
2010 7.22 (42nd) 4.00 (111th) 2.48 (150th) 6.64 (55th)
2011 7.22 (42nd) 4.00 (114th) 2.48 (152nd) 6.58 (57th)
2012 7.16 (43rd) 3.96 (116th) 2.48 (152nd) 5.75 (89th)
(Full mark: 10, Source: the Economist)
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 There would be several reasons why Sri 
Lanka did not have to have any international 
peace missions despite the serious conflicts 
between the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil 
Tigers but its peace-building process was 
relatively successful. One of them would be 
because  Sr i  Lanka  was  economica l l y 
developed compared with other states hosting 
international peace missions such as Timor-
Leste, Haiti and Afghanistan, as can be seen 
from Table 1.
 Among the four indicators, the democracy 
index is the only one whose figures  Timor-
Leste had improved and the other three states 
had deteriorated. Peace-building at least in 
the pol it ical  sector has been partial ly 
successful in Timor-Leste since the state has 
been slowly but steadily democratized. In 
contrast, the democracy index of Afghanistan 
had deteriorated despite the intervention of 
the huge NATO-led operations.
 Peace operations in Timor-Leste and Haiti 
have several conditions in common. Both of 
them had not only UN peace operations but 
also the short-term Chapter VII-led non-UN 
forces: INTERFET in Timor-Leste in 1999 and 
Discussion
 Comparing four indicators, the figures of Sri 
Lanka of almost all of indicators were better 
than those  o f  Timor-Leste ,  Ha i t i  and 
Afghanistan. The figures of Timor-Leste 
consistently came second, and those of Haiti 
also constantly came next. All of the figures of 
Afghanistan for the success indicators of 
peace-building were the worst of the four. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is a strong 
tendency of consistency concerning the four 
indicators among the four states.
 Afghanistan’s poor records indicate that 
strong and costly military involvement with a 
large number of personnel committed by great 
powers does not necessarily guarantee 
positive results in peace-building. ISAF might 
have contributed to security maintenance in 
Afghanistan, but have not improved peace-
building in the political and social factors. 
Presumably,  the latter would be more 
favorable for UN-led peace-building rather 
than security-building missions led by great 
powers. Afghanistan’s peace-building will be 
more successful when the above indicators 
improve.  
Table 4. Corruption Perceptions Index (including world ranking out of 177-182 countries)
Timor-Leste Haiti Afghanistan Sri Lanka
2007 2.6 (123rd) 1.6 (179th) 1.8 (172nd) 3.2 (94th)
2008 2.2 (145th) 1.4 (177th) 1.5 (176th) 3.2 (92th)
2009 2.2 (146th) 1.8 (168th) 1.3 (178th) 3.1 (97th)
2010 2.5 (145th) 2.2 (146th) 1.4 (176th) 3.2 (91st)
2011 2.4 (143rd) 1.8 (175th) 1.5 (180th) 3.3 (86th)
2012 33 (113rd) 19 (165th)   8  (174th)  40 (79th)
2013 30 (119th) 19 (163rd)   8  (175th)  37 (91st)
(Full mark: 10 from 2007 to 2011, and 100 in 2012 and 2013, Source: Transparency Index)
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international community to peace-building 
and state-building. The success of peace-
building in Timor-Leste was also identified in 
the political sector on the ground of the 
implementat ion of  par l iamentary  and 
presidential elections supported by the UN 
operations. In the comparative analysis, 
especially between the cases of UN peace-
building Timor-Leste and Haiti, Timor-Leste 
showed better records than Hait i  and 
Afghanistan in all of the indicators such as 
GDP per capita, mortality rate, democracy 
index, and corruption perception index.
 Nevertheless, this paper also concludes that 
the peace-building process in Timor-Leste has 
not been so optimistic. It was recognized by 
the security and political culture of rivalry and 
hostility involving youth gangs, a politically 
“winner-takes-all” approach, and the following 
marginalization of judicial and constitutional 
values by the politicians. Likewise, the 
negative aspects were identified by the social 
nepotism and corruption, and the short-
sighted economic vision by the government 
excessively dependent on the state’s limited 
natural resources.
 This paper can conclude that UN peace 
missions in Timor-Leste could contribute to 
peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-
building to the stage that, for example, a 
major civil war can be prevented and general 
elections can be continuously conducted. 
Meantime, the case of Timor-Leste indicates 
that UN peace-building efforts are faced with 
the multi-national force in Haiti in 1994. 
When one compares two cases of UN missions, 
Timor-Leste and Haiti, the result of the tables 
indicated that the peace-building process in 
Timor-Leste always had better performance 
than Haiti. The result is also significant for 
Timor-Leste in considering the fact that the 
UN operation in Haiti started as the mission of 
UNMIH as early as in 1993, while the first UN 
operation in Timor-Leste started as UNTAET 
in 1999. 
 The result of a corruption perceptions index 
in Table 4 indicated that the states which 
experience civil wars and internal conflicts, 
whether they used to host UN missions or not, 
are vulnerable to social corruption since the 
indices of all of the four states are consistently 
very low. Furthermore, it seems difficult that a 
corruption perception index can be improved 
in a short period. As stated before in this 
paper, the social sector such as the issue of 
corruption would be difficult for UN missions 
to be involved effectively.
Conclusion
 T h i s  p a p e r  a p p l i e d  C h a r l e s  C a l l ’s 
comprehensive standards on the success of 
UN peace-building to the case of Timor-Leste. 
On the whole, the post-conflict peace-building 
in Timor-Leste has played a positive role in 
the sectors  of  secur i ty  and economy. 
Currently, pro-Indonesian militias are far less 
likely to disrupt Timorese society and security, 
and the subsequent economic stability was 
due to  the  ef forts  o f  the  UN and the 
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